Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this paper underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. It argues that absent of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned by and large smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries creates favourable conditions for presidential activism.
Introduction
Research on semi-presidentialism has made great strides forward, with comparisons between regime types followed by comparisons between various types of semi-presidential countries. Semipresidentialism is where the constitution includes both a popularly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet accountable to the parliament (Elgie 1999: 13) . Most of the comparative research on semi-presidentialism has focused on regime stability, with authors interested in how variables such as presidential powers or divided government impact on the level of conflict between the two executives (Elgie 2016; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009 ). This body of work indicates, rather unsurprisingly, that cohabitation is on average more likely to produce conflict (Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013) . Also country studies, most of which are rather descriptive, have by and large detailed the relations between the president and the prime minister (PM) (Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013; Munkh-Erdene 2010; Shen 2011 ).
This case study of Lithuania departs from conventional approaches in three ways. First, we underscore the importance of institutions in facilitating successful leadership and policy coordination.
We ask 'do institutions matter' at the level of normal intra-executive decision-making (Weaver and Rockman 1993) . The basic premises are that institutional design is related to the level of conflict between the cabinet and the president, and that conflicts over policy, legislation or appointments are manifestations of coordination problems. Secondly, despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidentialism, we still know very little about the actual functioning of day-to-day routines and coordination mechanisms between the president and her administration on the one hand, and the PM and her cabinet on the other. With some notable exceptions (Elgie 2001; Raunio 2012) , even country studies have not probed the regular interaction between the executives. Our third contribution is methodological: utilizing interviews with key civil servants and politicians and governmental documents enables us to reach 'behind the scenes' and to understand the role of coordination mechanisms vis-à-vis other factors such as the personalities or party-political affiliations of the two executives.
We focus on Lithuania because it is in many ways representative of the Central and East European semi-presidential countries that became democratic in the 1990s. The powers of the president are mainly found in the area of external relations and the political culture is rather personality-centred.
Considering the lack of previous research, our study is at the same time exploratory and offers a tentative template for similar case studies or comparative analyses of other semi-presidential regimes -or indeed of countries where the president is not directly elected. Our goal is to pave way for a line of inquiry so far neglected in the literature on semi-presidential regimes. Scholarly understanding of Lithuanian politics remains also thin, and hence our article increases our knowledge of political leadership in Lithuania.
The goal of this paper is thus to examine the effect institutional design has on semi-presidentialism and particularly on the relations between the president and the PM. By institutional design, we mean those rules, organizational arrangements and conventions that structure routine coordination between the two executives. Hence this paper, drawing on in-depth interviews with Lithuanian top-level civil servants and politicians, official documents and secondary material such as biographies, digs deeper -beyond constitutional rules and party system factors -to explore the inside structures of semipresidential decision-making. Our research is driven by two inter-related questions: how does coordination between the president and PM actually work and how institutional design influences the balance of power and level of conflict between the two executives. Challenging previous accounts of the Lithuanian case, we argue that the existing modes of coordination facilitate presidential dominance. Given the political challenges facing many semi-presidential countries, the paper also seeks to identify institutional solutions that facilitate successful policy-making.
Theoretical framework: institutions and (dis)incentives for cooperation

Institutions and cooperation
Coordination or collective action problems are a key concern of institutional theory which studies how institutional design structures social behavior and influences political outcomes. Institutions are known for their longevity, with institutional changes normally brought about by critical junctures, such as major policy failures or significantly altered external circumstances (Thelen 1999) . The concept of path dependency is commonly utilized to explain why certain institutional models are adopted, and it emphasizes that initially adopted policies or organizational solutions become the appropriate course of action and, as 'rules of the game', structure political behavior with the consequence that 'particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse' (Pierson 2000: 251) . As a result, institutional arrangements tend to reproduce the distribution of power in political systems. (E.g., North 1990; Goodin 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000; Rhodes et al. 2006; Scott 2014) .
Apart from facilitating mutually beneficial outcomes, effective institutions reduce transaction costs and uncertainty in exchange, so that the individuals can anticipate each other's preferences and behavior. Institutions can thus induce actors otherwise driven by self-interest towards a 'problemsolving' mode characterized by cooperation and search for mutually beneficial solutions (Scharpf 1989) . Moreover, institutions can lengthen the time horizons of politicians through creating conditions for credible commitments, particularly when the game is repeated and interaction is regular among a small number of participants (North 1990; 1993) . Long-term, stable interaction should also strengthen the sociological or cultural explanations of institutions. The logic of appropriateness, initially developed by March and Olsen (1989; , perceives political activity as the product of matching behavioral norms to situations and highlights the rule-driven and socially embedded nature of human interactions, with individual action based on mutual understanding of what is the appropriate way to proceed. Hence it is connected to the socialization effects of institutions, with individuals becoming accustomed to the organizational norms and practices. In contrast with the identity-based logic of appropriateness, in the logic of consequences action is more guided by outcomes. Distinguishing between two such behavioral logics can be difficult (Goldmann 2005) , but again the main point is that rules are likely to be sustained as long as they are perceived both legitimate and efficient by the relevant actors.
(Dis)incentives for coordination in semi-presidential regimes
But why would the president and the PM adhere to common institutions? Why would they seek cooperation and institutional constraints to begin with? In line with path dependency, coordination may be a well-established practice regulated by laws, in which case unilateral rejection of cooperation by new office-holders is difficult. Cooperation can also benefit both sides as institutional theory informs us. Regular coordination of the two executives enables them to learn each other's preferences and bargaining styles and facilitates the identification and solving of problems, with both sides able to address potential grievances ex ante before the more formal or public decision-making stage.
Moreover, willingness to cooperate can be regarded as a sign of 'statesmanship', a quality that should enhance the re-election prospects of the president and the PM. Time constraints are also likely to favor coordination. While domestic political calendars can be altered, for example, in terms of when to introduce new legislation, similar rights do not extend to European or global negotiations. If the president and the PM are both involved in European Union (EU) or foreign affairs, then regular coordination makes it possible to react quickly to changing external circumstances.
Research nonetheless informs us that semi-presidentialism is prone to intra-executive conflict regardless of the specific constitutional form or level of democracy. For example, Protsyk (2006) and Shugart and Carey (1992) have identified intra-executive conflict in premier-presidential systems (where the cabinet can only be dismissed by the parliament), as well as in president-parliamentary systems (where both the president and the parliament have the formal power to dismiss the cabinet).
Other studies have observed intra-executive conflict in consolidated democracies (e.g. Conflicts between the president and PM can include a range of issues such as specific policies, appointments, or government performance. Indeed, there may be good reasons for politicians motivated by re-election or policy influence not to enter into cooperation or, despite coordination mechanisms, to 'go public' with their opinion differences. Under cohabitation the president and the PM are ideologically often quite far apart, and even when there is intra-executive coordination, presidents can in the end choose to exercise their right of veto over legislation or appointments or publicly criticize the government's policies while prime ministers may try to push through legislation they know will not please the president. For example, Lazardeux (2015) shows how electoral motives, particularly winning presidential elections, the main prize in French politics, have shaped the strategies of both executives. However, the impact of such confrontational behavior on overall intraexecutive relations is surely mitigated by regular coordination. Indeed, according to Elgie (2001) intra-executive relations in the French Fifth Republic during cohabitation have been characterized by both conflict and compromise. Conflict has surfaced in political gridlock, use of extraordinary constitutional and political procedures, and in battle for public opinion. With the exception of certain defence and foreign policy meetings, presidential advisers have not attended government meetings during these periods. Instead the president and the PM have met on a regular basis and the existence of regular channels for communication secures that even during public confrontations common tasks can still be carried out and mistakes be avoided.
Turning to distribution of power, constitutionally weak presidents can seek to compensate their limited powers with more obtrusive behavior, especially if they feel politically marginalized and need to signal their political views to the voters. If the government is clearly dominant, then also the PM can feel no need for coordination beyond perhaps the president's office receiving information about governmental decisions. The president and the PM should thus have stronger incentives to cooperate when there is a more balanced distribution of power between the government and the president and/or if the two executives share powers in a particular policy area. The latter applies especially to security and defence policies, issue areas where it is often emphasized that disunity at home should not undermine success abroad.
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Nor can one disregard other institutional and contextual variables. The dual legitimacy structure of semi-presidentialism is certainly relevant. Both the president and the PM derive legitimacy from popular elections, but the president leans on a direct electoral mandate while the latter is selected indirectly. Köker (2014) has found that directly elected presidents are more active in the legislative process. Similarly, Samuels and Shugart (2010) and Passarelli (2015) have shown how direct elections of the president shape the behavior of political parties. Moreover, presidential activism tends to be higher when the country is experiencing political turbulence, with low level of societal consensus or weak governments (Tavits 2009 ). These considerations are particularly relevant to Central and Eastern Europe, where surveys show high levels of public trust in presidents but outright distrust in the PM and the parties (New Europe Barometer 2004; Baltic Barometer 2014). Presidents can distance themselves from unpopular economic measures and day-to-day politics. Normally, they are constitutionally assigned to stand above party politics. The paradox, however, is that the presidents may experience that their popularity outweigh their formal powers and their de facto political influence. When seeking ways of converting their perceived prestige into 'real' power, they can publicly criticize the government by leaning on the popular mandate (Amorim Neto and Lobo 2009; Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013) . As seen in the next section, these arguments certainly apply to Lithuania.
Semi-presidentialism in Lithuania
The Lithuanian constitution, adopted in 1992, provides for a directly elected president with limited but more than marginal formal powers. The same person can hold the presidency for eight years, that is, two consecutive terms. Existing measures of formal presidential powers among semi-presidential countries in Central and Eastern Europe, place Lithuania in the middle range, on par with Croatia, Poland, and Romania (Elgie and Moestrup 2008; Doyle and Elgie 2014) . The president nominates the PM, who is confirmed by the Seimas (parliament) and only the parliament can dismiss the PM.
The president's appointment powers are quite extensive and she has the right to nominate the chair and a number of judges of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, the Chairman of the National Bank, the Commander of the Army, the Head of the Security Service, and the Prosecutor General. The president's policy powers are directed to foreign affairs. According to Article 84:1, she 'shall decide the basic issues of foreign policy and, together with the Government, conduct foreign policy.' The implementation of foreign policy thus requires close cooperation between the president and the PM.
TABLE 1
Previous analyses of semi-presidentialism in Eastern Europe suggest that Lithuania is among those countries with lowest frequency of intra-executive conflict (Protsyk 2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013) . Table 1 lists the Lithuanian presidents and the governments that they have shared power with.
The picture of relative harmony is, however, somewhat blurred by the so-called 'Paksasgate', the 
Empirical analysis
The period of analysis runs from the early 1990s until 2016. We focus on the presidencies of Brazauskas, Adamkus, and Grybauskaitė, with the short presidency of Paksas referred to in so far as it impacted on subsequent intra-executive relations. Our data consists of official documents 2 , semistructured in-depth interviews with senior civil servants and politicians, and other supplementary material such as news items and politicians' memoirs. The analysis was carried out in two stages:
using government documents, we first identified the coordination mechanisms, with the interviews providing behind-the-scenes information from both sides -the president and the PM -about the actual role of such instruments and overall intra-executive relations. Given the highly sensitive nature of the topic, the interviewees were willing to speak only on the condition of strict anonymity. A total of nine interviews were carried out. The interviewed persons were current or former high-level civil servants or advisers in the offices of the PM and the president, two speakers of Seimas, one former prime minister and one former foreign minister.
3
Coordination mechanisms
Institutional theory underlines the importance of initial decisions over policy or organizations that 'lock in' subsequent choices. It also emphasizes the role of critical junctures that can bring about fundamental change, rendering past practices illegitimate and ineffective. In Lithuania, the transition to democratic rule in the early 1990s was certainly a case of both: not only did it introduce a major overhaul of the whole political system, but it also necessitated decisions about how the country was to be governed.
When Lithuania achieved independence, the institution of presidency was re-introduced. It is evident that considerations about the exact powers of the president and particularly inter-institutional relations were trumped by more pressing concerns. At that time the young democracy had more urgent issues that needed attention: kick-starting the economy, foreign and defence policy, and in general just ensuring a smooth transition to democratic rule and market economy. The period was also characterized by tensions between different camps, and these influenced also discussions about presidency with the popular mood appearing to favour a strong leader. (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas 2006; Krupavičius 2008; 2013; Norkus 2013 ) There were initial plans to issue a decree about coordination between the president and the other state institutions, but this idea was rejected. The reasons for rejection included time pressure, political opposition, and also it was not perceived appropriate to regulate such matters by laws. However, it was nonetheless recognized that cooperation between the central state institutions was a prerequisite for successful policy-making (Brazauskas 2007: 63) .
These initial decisions are clearly reflected in subsequent intra-executive cooperation which takes many forms, but almost none of it is based on written rules (Table 2) . 4 The president meets both the PM and other ministers, with particularly meetings with the prime minister taking place regularly.
Nonetheless, a lot depends on the preferences of the president and her/his relationship with the ruling coalition and its parliamentary majority. Meetings with other cabinet members can also be interpreted the ruling coalition and whilst he met PM Vagnorius (Homeland Union) regularly, the latter emphasized the need to respect the jurisdictional limits set by the constitution. In his memoirs Brazauskas (2007: 82) observed that during the period of more than a year of cohabitation, the PM 'had never given a phone call' to the president.
Adamkus came from a very different background, having served in the Environmental Protection
Agency of the United States for nearly two decades. Adamkus (2004: 38) not least when the governing coalition seemed not to be operating effectively. However, it appears that during his second term Adamkus adopted overall a less assertive stance, with the balance of power more in favor of the PM even during the minority government of Kirgilas (2006 Kirgilas ( -2008 . In Adamkus' second term, he faced PMs and cabinets from opposing political camps most of the period.
In addition, the political scandal surrounding Paksas' impeachment called for a less confrontational approach in order to rebuild confidence in the political system in general and in the presidency in particular.
By all accounts, president Grybauskaitė became more powerful than her predecessors. Her team of advisers followed the governmental agenda closely according to their spheres of competence, and again the advisers covered issues outside of presidential jurisdiction (economic and social policy, national security, education, science and culture, legal affairs, interior policy, foreign policy).
Grybauskaitė met the PM weekly, and all of these meetings as well as meetings with other ministers were publicly announced. Also during Grybauskaitė's presidency it was acknowledged that coordination between the three main state institutions is necessary as no actor can alone achieve anything. Thus, working relations are maintained with the governing coalition, individual ministers, party leaders, and the sectoral committees of the Seimas. Discussions are held in order to avoid conflicts and even in the event of a (public) disagreement both sides try to build a compromise. Respective communication officers from the offices of the PM and the president coordinate their activities to ensure that potential disagreements do not surface, particularly in foreign and security policy. Again, this cooperation is not based on any written rules: the goal is simply to inform one another of developments and of forthcoming speeches or press releases.
All presidents have intervened in the life-cycle of governments. Grybauskaité made it clear that she pays special attention to the competence of the minister of finance.
Where is it written or forbidden? The power of interpretation and initiative
The preceding analysis confirms that absent of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding intraexecutive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation.
The transition period from authoritarian to democratic rule presented the opportunity to set rules about coordination, but various motives worked against it. In line with institutional theory, the adopted approach has become the appropriate course of action, with each new president bringing her own staff, personality and leadership style to the equation. The presidents also have the power of initiative regarding cooperation, with forms and levels of intra-executive coordination essentially always determined by the president. For example, while joint councils or ministerial committees might facilitate better coordination, presidents do not need such bodies. As one interviewee put it:
'Presidents that have enough powers do not create such councils, they do not need such kind of institutions, they just arrange ad hoc meetings despite the fact that it is not foreseen in any law.'
The obvious challenge stemming from lack of rules is that power can be very much 'up for grabs', particularly given the political culture which favors strong leadership and presidential activism (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas 2006; Norkus 2013) . As one of our informants succinctly put it: 'one side might ask "where is it written?" and another can argue "where is it forbidden?"' There is a rather broadly shared expectation, especially by citizens, that the president is the 'political authority'. Even if the party-political 'centre of power' swings in favor of the PM, it is the job of the president to ensure the 'smooth functioning' of the political system. This point came repeatedly across in the interviews, and is strongly emphasized in various political and legal texts. At the same time we should not exaggerate the powers of the Lithuanian president. The balance of power between the Seimas, the government and the president ensures that the president can achieve very little alone -and this in fact explains the strategic behaviour of the president and her advisers.
Despite the lack of rules, intra-executive coordination does exist and in most instances conflicts are avoided. This applies particularly to foreign and security policy -an issue area that is both highly salient and where the president and the government constitutionally share power. Also the perceived role of the president as a 'constructive statesman' constrains the incumbents. But while Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned by and large smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries does create favorable conditions for presidential activism. This can turn into a serious problem without adequate constitutional checks and balances or during a long-term political and economic turmoil.
Future research should explore whether the patterns found in Lithuania apply to other semipresidential countries. One obvious source of variation is presidential powers, with the president and the PM having stronger incentives to seek cooperation when there is a more balanced distribution of power between the two executives. Regardless of cohabitation or other institutional factors, coordination should be strongest in foreign and security policy and in EU affairs. Whether EU with its frequent top-level meetings functions as an external factor inducing more active coordination could be examined through analyzing non-EU countries. In general, more institutionalized and regular coordination should result in less conflicts between the two executives.
1 Here a good example is Finland. While recent constitutional reforms have drastically reduced presidential powers, foreign policy is co-directed between the government and the president. Foreign and security policy is also a highly sensitive and salient issue area where national consensus is the norm. Hence the president meets both the PM and the foreign minister essentially every week, and, just as in France, these confidential exchanges contribute to coherent leadership in external affairs (Raunio 2012 ). The discontinuation of the Council may have stemmed from the plan of the president Paksas to use the body for coordinating EU policy as well. The role of the Council was seen as limited and there were also concerns about its constitutional status. 7 Brazauskas also utilized a Political Consultation Council for domestic matters, the membership of which included representatives of the major parties and prominent figures from science, art and education. 8 However, in spring 2016 Grybauskaitė stopped having these meetings with the PM, and for almost six months there were no regular working meetings with the prime minister.
9 Following the first presidential elections in 1993 the cabinet of Bronislovas Lubys resigned in order to enable the president to form the new government. However, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1998 that the government is dependent only on the support of the parliamentary majority. 
